Over the past 4 years, Alan Estevez has continued to uncover latest obstacles to position in China's path because the country seeks to make use of U.S. technology to develop cutting-edge chips and artificial intelligence.
“We’re running down the alley throwing trash cans,” Estevez told the Financial Times on his penultimate day as undersecretary of commerce, industry and security in Joe Biden’s administration.
Estevez and Tarun Chhabra, a White House official, were answerable for measures geared toward slowing China's semiconductor and AI industries by cutting off access to key U.S. technology.
In its final week, the Commerce Department unveiled several key rules, including a worldwide licensing system for AI chips for data centers, that faced opposition from industry and criticism from the European Commission.
Estevez acknowledged that US policy can only slow China since the country has smart engineers, money for investment and government support. But he said Washington had been successful, pointing to statements from Chinese AI groups that cited U.S. export controls as their primary obstacle.
“We have definitely compromised the People's Republic of China's ability to supply these chips, and due to this fact their ability to develop large language models,” Estevez said, referring to the models that power AI products.
The outgoing undersecretary has grappled with two forces: American businesses and a few allies who consider the U.S. has gone too far, and critics who wanted the administration to take even tougher and faster motion against China and its military.
He pushed back against criticism of the recent AI rule, which divides countries into three tiers for quick access to U.S. chips. Estevez said it appears to be drawing more criticism since the suing corporations like Nvidia are household names, unlike chipmaking equipment makers which have defied other export controls.
Over the past 4 years, Estevez and Chhabra have held long and sometimes contentious talks with allies, particularly Japan and the Netherlands, to construct a seamless export control system for chip-making tools.
Tokyo and The Hague ultimately agreed to many measures pushed by Washington – in some cases after threats of extraterritorial motion – however the talks highlighted an issue for the US and its allies: Chinese retaliation. Beijing threatened to limit exports of two critical minerals, gallium and germanium, to Japan if it agrees with Washington.
“We must think more about the best way to wean ourselves from adversarial supply chains,” Estevez said, explaining the necessity to limit Beijing’s ability to create bottlenecks that make it difficult for the U.S. and its allies to take motion against China.
“I wish we had done it sooner. . . shares our intelligence (with allies) and tells us where we see threats,” he said. “When we do this, they really say, 'Yes, you're right,' and that makes the dialogue easier.”
Estevez noted that some corporations found it obscure the national security implications of selling technology to China, particularly because they’d focused on that marketplace for many years before Washington became more aggressive toward Beijing.
“It was like 'gung ho' for the American economy until suddenly it's not there anymore. I don't think everyone seems to be clear of their strategic serious about where those lines are,” Estevez said, adding that the U.S. government needs to higher explain the risks to corporations that don't have security clearances.
While the federal government faced criticism from industry, others questioned why the federal government didn't move more quickly against Chinese telecom equipment maker Huawei's efforts to maneuver into the chip sector.
Estevez said the U.S. has been “really successful” in using controls to focus on equipment going to Huawei-linked factories.
But he said the U.S. couldn’t take immediate motion when it discovered in 2023 that Huawei was constructing factories to make chips, partially because unilateral steps wouldn’t have been effective and in addition since it needed more intelligence to tell the case To explain the threat to allies and to look for his or her comrades-in-arms. Operation.
As Estevez leaves office, he stressed that the Bureau of Industry and Security, which he leads, needs more resources to take care of the growing threat. It also needs more modern technologies, including AI, to extend efficiency, for instance to maintain track of Chinese corporations that change their names to avoid US control.
“I wish I could have made the interagency process a bit of more agile and strategic,” he said, noting that he and Chhabra would normally “make a deal” but then must take care of your complete government.
Estevez said his biggest concern as he prepared handy the reins to Donald Trump's team was China's tech sector, particularly AI, which he called the “way forward for warfare.”
“It may even be the nice side of this future,” he said, “and we’ll only prevent the bad side of this future.”
